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Forthcoming in Ruth Okediji, ed., COPYRIGHT IN AN AGE OF EXCEPTIONS AND 
LIMITATIONS (Cambridge University Press 2015) 
THE AUTHOR’S PLACE IN THE FUTURE OF COPYRIGHT
*
 




Two encroachments, one long-standing, the other a product of the digital 
era, cramp the author’s place in copyright today.  First, most authors lack 
bargaining power; the real economic actors in the copyright system have long 
been the publishers and other exploiters to whom authors cede their rights.  These 
actors may advance the figure of the author for the moral lustre it lends their 
appeals to lawmakers, but then may promptly despoil the creators of whatever 
increased protections they may have garnered.  Second, the advent of new 
technologies of creation and dissemination of works of authorship not only 
threatens traditional revenue models, but also calls into question whatever 
artistic control the author may – or should - retain over her work.  After 
reviewing these challenges, I will consider legal measures to protect authors from 
leonine contracts, and measures in the marketplace to obtain compensation for 
the exploitation of their rights, in order to assure authors better remuneration, as 
well as more power over the ways their works encounter their public. 
 
The author’s place in the future of copyright (assuming copyright has a 
future) will not be assured until the full range of her interests, monetary and 
moral, receive both recognition and enforcement. Online micropayment and other 
systems for remunerating individual authors (including by means of collective 
licensing), albeit often embryonic, hold promise.  But will these new means of 
remunerating authors (or for that matter older business models which, while often 
divesting authors of their rights, also often afforded them an income stream) 
remain viable in a digital environment in which paying for creativity increasingly 
seems an act of largesse?  Most fundamentally, we need to appreciate authorship, 
and to recognize that a work in digital form is a thing of value,  lest the old adage 
that “information” (meaning, works of authorship) “wants to be free” presage 
works of authorship that don’t “want” to be created. 
                                                          
 * © Jane C. Ginsburg 2015. 
 ** Morton L. Janklow Professor of Literary and Artistic Property Law, Columbia 
University School of Law.  Thanks to Prof. Jessica Litman for trenchant criticisms, and for 
research assistance to Jennifer Maul, Columbia Law School class of 2008, to Emily Weiss, 
Columbia Law School class of 2009, and especially to Allyson Mackavage, Columbia Law School 
class of 2015. 
 Parts of this Essay are  based both on a lecture first given at the American Philosophical 
Society, November 9, 2007, later delivered at Willamette University College of Law, September 
10, 2008 and subsequently revised for publication in 153 PROCEEDINGS OF THE AMERICAN 
PHILOSOPHICAL SOCIETY 147 (2009), also published at 45 WILLAMETTE LAW REV. 381(2009); 
and on a lecture given in November 2012 at Victoria University of Wellington (N.Z.) and 
subsequently published as Exceptional Authorship: the Role of Copyright Exceptions in Promoting 
Creativity, in Susy Frankel and Daniel Gervais, eds., EVOLUTION AND EQUILIBRIUM: COPYRIGHT 
THIS CENTURY15 (Cambridge Univ. Press 2014). 






 “In the beginning was the Reader.”  And the Reader, in a 
Pirandello-esque flash of insight, went in search of an Author, for the 
Reader realized that without an Author, there could be no Readers.  
But when the Reader met an Author, the Author, anticipating Dr. 
Johnson, scowled, “No man but a blockhead ever wrote, except for 
money.”1 
 
 And the Reader calculated the worth of a free supply of 
blockhead-written works against the value of recognizing the 
Author’s economic self-interest.  She concluded that the author’s 
interest is also her interest, that the “public interest” encompasses 
both that of authors and of readers.  So she looked upon copyright, 
and saw that it was good. 
 
This, in essence, is the philosophy that informs the 1710 English Statute of 
Anne (the first copyright statute), and the 1787 U.S. Constitution’s copyright 
clause. The latter provides: “Congress shall have Power . . . to promote the 
Progress of Science by securing for limited Times to Authors . . . the exclusive 
Right to their Writings . . .”, U.S. CONT., art. I, § 8, cl. 8.  In the Anglo-American 
system, copyright enabled the public to have what Thomas Babbington Macaulay 
heralded as “a supply of good books” and other works that promote the progress 
of learning.2  Copyright did this by assuring authors “the exclusive Right to their . 
. . Writings”—that is, a property right giving authors sufficient control over and 
compensation for their works to make it worth their while to be creative.3 
Vesting copyright in Authors—rather than exploiters—was an innovation in 
the 18th century.4  It made authorship the functional and moral center of the 
system.  But all too often in fact, authors neither control nor derive substantial 
benefits from their work.  In the copyright polemics of today, moreover, authors 
are curiously absent; the overheated rhetoric that currently characterizes much of 
the academic and popular press tends to portray copyright as a battleground 
between evil industry exploiters and free-speaking users.5  If authors have any 
                                                          
1. Samuel Johnson, in BARTLETT’S FAMILIAR QUOTATIONS 328 (John Bartlett & Justin 
Kaplan eds., 17th ed. 2002) (quoting JAMES BOSWELL, LIFE OF JOHNSON (Apr. 5, 1776)). 
2. Thomas B. Macaulay, Speech before the House of Commons (Feb. 5, 1841), in 
MACAULAY: PROSE AND POETRY 733–34 (G.M. Young ed., 1970). 
3. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.  Both the Statute of Anne (England 1710), and the U.S. 
Constitution”s copyright clause highlight the role of exclusive rights in promoting the progress of 
learning. 
4. Before the Statute of Anne, the printing privilege system in force in many European states 
generally conferred the monopoly on printers, though authors too might receive privileges.  Papal 
printing privileges appear to have been granted to authors at least as frequently as to printers or 
booksellers.  See Jane C. Ginsburg, Proto-property in Literary and Artistic Works: Sixteenth-
Century Papal Printing Privileges, 36 COLUM. J. L. & THE ARTS 345 (2013).  Nonetheless, the 
Statute of Anne was the first legislation systematically to vest authors with exclusive rights. 
5. See, e.g., John Tehranian, INFRINGEMENT NATION: COPYRIGHT 2.0 AND YOU 14 (2011) 
(describing today”s copyright laws as “a legal regime that threatens to make criminal infringers of 
us all”); id. at. 129 (“[T]he widening ambit of copyright protection has increasingly encroached 
upon critical First Amendment values, suppressing transformative uses of copyrighted works that 
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role in this scenario, it is at most a walk-on, a cameo appearance as victims of 
monopolist “content owners.”6  The disappearance of the author moreover 
justifies disrespect for copyright—after all, those downloading teenagers aren’t 
ripping off the authors and performers, the major record companies have already 
done that.7 
Two encroachments, one long-standing, the other a product of the digital era, 
cramp the author’s place in copyright today.  First, most authors lack bargaining 
power; the real economic actors in the copyright system have long been the 
publishers and other exploiters to whom authors cede their rights.  These actors 
may advance the figure of the author for the moral lustre it lends their appeals to 
lawmakers, but then may promptly despoil the creators of whatever increased 
protections they may have garnered.  Second, the advent of new technologies of 
creation and dissemination of works of authorship not only threatens traditional 
revenue models, but also calls into question whatever artistic control the author 
may – or should - retain over her work.  After reviewing these challenges, I will 
consider legal measures to protect authors from leonine contracts, and measures in 
the marketplace to obtain compensation for the exploitation of their rights. 
1.  Authors and Copyright Ownership 
Copyright vests in a work’s creator as soon as she “fixes” it in any tangible 
medium of expression.8  But for many authors, ownership is quickly divested, and 
for some, it never attaches at all.  The latter group of creators are “employees for 
hire,” salaried authors who create works in pursuit of their employment, or 
freelancers who are commissioned to create certain kinds of works, and who sign 
a contract specifying that the work will be “for hire.”9  An author who is not an 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
advance creativity and free speech rights”); LAWRENCE LESSIG, FREE CULTURE: HOW BIG MEDIA 
USES TECHNOLOGY AND THE LAW TO LOCK DOWN CULTURE AND CONTROL CREATIVITY (2004); 
Electronic Frontier Foundation, Intellectual Property, http://www.eff.org/issues/intellectual-
property (last visited Feb. 4, 2015) (noting that dysfunctional IP systems give “IP owners a veto 
on innovation and free speech.”); Amanda Beshears Cook, Copyright and Freedom of Expression: 
Saving Free Speech from Advancing Legislation, 12 CHI.-KENT J. INTELL. PROP. 1, 20--21 (2013) 
(discussing the entertainment industry’s efforts to push through legislation that would diminish 
first amendment interests); Jenna Wortham, With Twitter, Blackouts and Demonstrations, Web 
Flexes Its Muscle, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 18, 2012, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/01/19/technology/protests-of-antipiracy-bills-unite-
web.html?pagewanted=all. 
6 But see PETER BALDWIN, THE COPYRIGHT WARS: THREE CENTURIES OF TRANS-ATLANTIC 
BATTLE (2014) (opposing the author-oriented Continental copyright tradition against the public-
minded Anglo-American copyright tradition and contending that undue attention to authors 
restricts access to culture and suppresses expression). 
7.  David Cloyd, Music Thievery Laid Bare: When Pirates Rip Off Working Class Artists, 
THE TRICHORDIST, Feb. 8, 2014 available at http://thetrichordist.com/2014/02/08/music-thievery-
laid-bare-when-pirates-rip-off-the-working-class-artist-guest-post-by-david-cloyd/ (noting that 
many pirates “see themselves as modern-day Robin Hoods, fighting against corporate greed and 
the tyranny of the big bad music industry”); Cord Jefferson, The Music Industry’s Funny Money, 
THE ROOT, July 6, 2010, available at 
http://www.theroot.com/articles/culture/2010/07/the_root_investigates_who_really_gets_paid_in_
the_music_industry.html?GT1=38002 (finding that the musicians receive about 13% of profits 
whereas the record label and distributors receive a combined 87%). 
8. See 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2006). 
9. Id. at §§ 101, 201(b). 
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employee for hire starts out with rights that she may transfer by contract; unlike 
many continental European laws, the U.S. copyright law places few limitations on 
the scope of the rights she may transfer.10  Moreover, unlike those foreign laws, 
the U.S. copyright law contains few mandatory remuneration provisions.11  Thus 
it is possible for a U.S. author, “for good and valuable consideration” (which 
could be the mere fact of disseminating the work) to assign “all right, title and 
interest in and to the work, in all media, now known or later developed, for the 
full term of copyright, including any renewals and extensions thereof, for the full 
territory, which shall be the Universe.”12  I’m not making this up.  The Roz Chast 
New Yorker “Ultimate Contract” cartoon was not so far off in further specifying: 
“and even if one day they find a door in the Universe that leads to a whole new 
non-Universe place, . . . or everything falls into a black hole so nobody knows 
which end is up and we’re all dead anyway so who cares, we’ll STILL own all 
those rights . . . .”13  Worse, with one exception, this is a valid contract.  The 
exception is not the extra-terrestrial aspect; authors can, it seems, validly grant 
rights for Mars (at least if the grant is governed by U.S. law).  It concerns the 
author’s inalienable right to terminate grants of rights 35 years after the grant was 
executed.  Thus, even if the contract purports to grant rights in perpetuity and for 
a lump sum, the author can nonetheless retrieve most of her U.S. rights 35 years 
after the conclusion of the contract.14  This is a very important, but otherwise 
isolated, U.S. legislative nod to authors’ weak bargaining position.15  
                                                          
10. Compare id. at § 204(a) (grant of exclusive rights must be in writing and signed by 
grantor) with France, Code of Intellectual Property, arts. L 131-1 – L 131-9, L 132-1 – L 132-34, 
available at http://www.wipo.int/wipolex/en/text.jsp?file_id=179120 (detailed provisions 
concerning contracts, including rules protecting authors against overreaching transfers). 
11. Certain compulsory licenses include mandatory set-asides or percentages for certain 
classes of creators.  See, e.g., 17 U.S.C. § 114(g)(2) (“Proceeds From Licensing of 
Transmissions”). 
12.  For examples of these kinds of contracts, see Keep Your Copyrights, Clauses about 
General Assignment of Copyright,  
http://web.law.columbia.edu/keep-your-copyrights/contracts/clauses/by-
type/10/overreachinghttp://keepyourcopyrights.org/contracts/clauses/by-type/10/ 
overreaching (last visited Jan. 30Feb. 4, 2015). 
13. Roz Chast, The Ultimate Contract, THE NEW YORKER, Aug. 11, 2003, available at 
http://www.condenaststore.com/-sp/The-Ultimate-Contract-New-Yorker-Cartoon-
Prints_i8534476_.htm  
14. See 17 U.S.C. § 203.  For extensive historical and doctrinal analysis of authors” reversion 
rights, see, e.g., Lionel Bently and Jane C. Ginsburg, “The sole right shall return to the Author”: 
Anglo-American Authors” Reversion Rights from the Statute of Anne to Contemporary U.S. 
Copyright, 25 BERKELEY TECHNOLOGY LAW JOURNAL 1475 (2011) 
15 Thus, the U.S. copyright law lacks the kind of author-protective provisions now found in 
German and French law, which guarantee proportional or fair remuneration as well as some 
control over new modes of exploitation.  See Copyright Act, Sept. 9, 1965, Federal Law Gazette 
Part I, at 1273 (Ger.), as last amended by Article 8 of the Act of 1 Oct. 2013 (Federal Law Gazette 
Part I, 3714), arts. 31-41; Code of intellectual property, arts. L. 131-1 - 131-6; L. 132-1 - 132-17 
(Fr.), as modified by Ordonnance n° 2014-1348 of November 12 2014 modifying the provisions of 
the Code of intellectual property respecting publishing contracts, Journal Officiel de la République 
Française n°0262, November 13, 2014, page 19101, 
http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/affichTexte.do;jsessionid=3784253FD9F4E4382CC4719AC49F50
A3.tpdjo11v_1?cidTexte=JORFTEXT000029750455&dateTexte=20141114 , discussed infra.  
For a review of EU legal restrictions on the scope of authors contracts and obligations to 
remunerate authors, see generally SÉVERINE DUSOLLIER ET. AL, CONTRACTUAL ARRANGEMENTS 
APPLICABLE TO CREATORS: LAW AND PRACTICE OF SELECTED MEMBER STATES (Citizens’ Rights 
and Constitutional Affairs, Policy Department ed., 2014), available at 
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Unfortunately, authors or their heirs have not always fared well in court when 
they seek to enforce their termination rights.  For example, courts have upheld 
grantees’ assertions that the work was “for hire” and therefore not subject to 
termination,16 and they have invalidated termination attempts for failure to 
comply with the statute’s many prerequisites to effective exercise of the right.17 
It’s no accident that the copyright law of the U.S. and other common law 
countries favors easy alienability of authors’ rights.  Our legal system frowns on 
“restraints on alienation.”18  Perhaps ironically, the ability freely to part with 
property is a hallmark of its ownership.  That this works to the benefit of the so-
called “content industries” could traditionally be justified as consistent with the 
overall goals of the copyright scheme.  These are not only to promote the care and 
feeding of authors, but also—some would contend, primarily—to ensure the 
dissemination of works of authorship.19  After all, the constitutional goal “to 
promote the progress of science” is not met merely by creating works; someone 
has to get them from the author’s pen (or laptop) into the public’s hands.  To the 
extent that authors retard that process by endeavoring to withhold some rights, or 
make it more expensive by demanding more pay for rights granted, they can seem 
like pesky interlopers.  Australian writer Miles Franklin (best known for her novel 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/etudes/join/2014/493041/IPOL-
JURI_ET%282014%29493041_EN.pdf 
16 See, e.g.,  Marvel Characters, Inc. v. Kirby, 726 F.3d 119, 143 (2d Cir. 2013) (concluding that 
Kirby’s comic book characters were works made for hire, and therefore Kirby had no right to 
terminate transfer of copyright to Marvel); Siegel v. Warner Bros. Entm’t, 542 F. Supp. 2d 1098, 
1064--79 (C.D. Cal. 2008) (finding that certain “Superman” works were works made for hire, and 
therefore not within scope of termination right); Fifty-Six Hope Road Music Ltd. v. UMG 
Recordings, Inc., 99 U.S.P.Q. 1735, 2010 WL 3564258, at *9 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (finding that 
certain works by Bob Marley were works made for hire, and therefore heirs were not entitled to 
renewal term). 
17 See, e.g., -DC Comics v. Pacific Pictures Corp., 545 Fed. App’x 678, 680 (9th Cir. 2013), cert. 
denied, 135 S. Ct. 144 (2014) (holding that agreement between copyright transferee and 
beneficiary of life pension granted to “Superman” co-creator Joseph Shuster waived right to 
termination by statutory heirs of termination right); Siegel, 542 F. Supp. 2d at 1118, 1126 (holding 
that portions of “Superman” materials were outside of the scope of termination notices due to time 
limitations and statutory heirs of co-creator Jerry Siegel failed to terminate copyright grants as to 
those materials); Burroughs v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc., 683 F.2d 610, 622 (2d Cir. 1982) 
(holding that termination notice’s failure to list five Tarzan titles failed to terminate the copyright 
interest in those titles). See generally Bently & Ginsburg, supra at 1572-86 (discussing caselaw 
construing termination rights); 1586-87 (concluding that legal limits on scope of transfers might 
serve authors better than termination rights).   
18. See generally 61 AM. JUR. 2D Perpetuities § 90 (2002); Bd. of County Supervisors of 
Prince William County, Va. v. United States, 48 F.3d 520 (Fed. Cir. 1995); Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. 
Strnad, 876 P.2d 1362 (Kan. 1994); Cole v. Peters, 3 S.W.3d 846 (Mo. Ct. App. W.D. 1999). 
19. See, e.g., R. Anthony Reese, A Map of the Frontiers of Copyright, 85 TEX. L. REV. 1979, 
1982–84 (2007); Jessica Litman, Readers’ Copyright, 58 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y 325, 339 (2011); 
Julie E. Cohen, Copyright as Property in the Post-Industrial Economy: A Research Agenda, 2011 
WIS. L. REV. 141, 143 “the purpose of copyright is to enable the provision of capital and 
organization so that creative work may be exploited”); Malla Pollack, What Is Congress Supposed 
to Promote? Defining “Progress” in Article I, Section 8, Clause 8 of the United States 
Constitution, or Introducing the Progress Clause, 80 NEB. L. REV. 754, 773, 809 (2001) (equating 
“progress” in the constitutional sense with the dissemination of ideas).  But see Wendy J. Gordon, 
The Core of Copyright: Authors, Not Publishers, 52 HOUSTON L. REV. 613 (2014) (Congress does 




“My Brilliant Career”), captured this annoyance in “Bring the Monkey,” her 1933 
parody of the English country house murder mystery. The conversation she 
imagined among members of Britain’s budding motion picture industry 
anticipates what today’s motion picture and television producers may have been 
fantasizing when the members of the Writers Guild went on strike a few years ago 
for a decent share of the income from new media “platforms” such as the Internet.  
Miles Franklin wrote: 
 
  [T]hey [the  “film magnates”] were generally agreed that the total 
elimination of the author would be a tremendous advance.  . . . 
  “Authors,” said this gentleman, “are the bummest lot of cranks I 
have ever been up against.  Why the heck they aren’t content to beat it 
once they get a price for their stuff, gets my goat.”  . . . 
  There was ready agreement that authors were a wanton tax on any 
industry, whether publishing, drama or pictures.  . . . 
  “I understand your point of view,” [the film producer] said 
suavely. “That is why I want you to see my film—one reason.”  “It has 
been assembled by experts in the industry, not written by some wayward 
outsider.”  . . .  
 
[And, indeed, in the film] [t]here was no suggestion of an author.  
[Instead, the suave producer] was listed twice, as continuity expert and 
producer.”20 
 
A copyright law for “continuity experts and producers” (also known as  
reality television coordinators) or, as the French might more pithily put it, “le 
droit d’auteur sans auteur” – now there is a vision to spur illegal downloading 
and streaming as civil disobedience: let’s strike a blow for authors by stealing 
from the corporations that fleece them. 
2.   What if Authors Retained their Copyrights? 
 What difference would it make were authors to retain their copyrights?  If 
it is easy to discredit copyright on the ground that authors have always served as a 
shill for large, unlovable corporations,21 would copyright’s detractors rally to the 
cause of exclusive rights to control the exploitation of works of authorship were 
authors the true beneficiaries?22 While authors’ divestiture may enable copyright 
antagonists to unmask the corporate wolves who strut the moral high ground in 
the sheep’s clothing of romantic authorship,23 I doubt that restoring romantic 
authors to their estates will in fact enhance the popularity of their property rights.  
After all, proprietary authorship implies not only economic power, but also 
control over the work’s artistic expression.  That, in turn, may rankle not only the 
apostles of remix, but also those who contest the concept of individual creativity 
in an environment that, as Peter Jaszi predicted in the Paleolithic early 1990s, is 
                                                          
20. MILES FRANKLIN, BRING THE MONKEY  38–40, 74 (1933). 
21 See, e.g., W. PATRY, MORAL PANICS AND THE COPYRIGHT WARS 76 (2009). 
22 See, e.g., Jessica Litman, War and Peace, 53 J COPYRIGHT SOC. 1, 19--20 (2006) (suggesting 
copyright would win more hearts and minds were authors truly its beneficiaries). 
23 For exculpation of the “romantic author,” see Lionel Bently, R. v. The Author:  From Death 
Penalty to Community Service, 32 Colum. J.L. & Arts 1 (2008) 
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making authorship an enterprise that is “polyvocal . . . increasingly collective . . . 
and collaborative.”24  With the increasing Wikipediafication of content, the 
“wisdom of crowds”25 overtakes individual expertise in the production of works 
that everyone can pitch in to create, add to, or modify.   
The advent of what I’ll call the “techno postmodernist participant,” 
challenges proprietary authorship in two ways.  First, if creativity now is so 
dispersed, then no one can claim to have originated a work of authorship, so 
perhaps no one can fairly own a copyright, either.  Second, the communal culture 
undermines the incentive rationale for copyright.  The Internet may have topped 
up our supply of Johnsonian “blockheads.”26 In addition to the poets who burn 
with inner fire, for whom creation is allegedly its own reward, and others (such as 
law professors) for whom other gainful employment permits authorial altruism, 
we now have Internet exhibitionists (call them bloggers) and “crowdsources,” 
masses of incremental contributors whose participation, whether occasional or 
obsessive, belies the Johnsonian calculus.  These creators supposedly do not need 
the carrot of exclusive rights in order to produce works of authorship.   
This is, of course, a very short-sighted view, for it describes motivations at a 
particular point in time.  Filthy lucre may not have spurred the first endeavor; 
many new creators hunger for exposure over income.  But to remain a creator 
requires material as well as moral sustenance.  We may cheer those who 
generously give their works to the public; we may pause, however when they seek 
to impose that generosity on other authors’ works. 
Moreover, just as “copyright industries” may cynically have appropriated the 
rhetoric of romantic authorship, so may technology interests convert calls for 
communitarianism to their own benefit.  A pre-Internet copyright-exploiting 
technology furnishes an example: as French legal historian Laurent Pfister has 
demonstrated, the rhetoric accompanying the rise of the radio in the 1920s and 
1930s seems freshly ripped from a current blog.  “The moral claims of the 
community trump the selfish interests of authors who should be obliged to 
abandon their works so that they may be distributed to the collectivity,” urged a 
representative of the French broadcasting industry.27  Authors’ property rights 
reflect a spirit of individualism out of step with the times; “the author has moral 
obligations to the society which forms the cultural basis for his work.  Society has 
                                                          
24 Peter Jaszi, On the Author Effect: Contemporary Copyright and Collective Creativity, 10 
Cardozo Arts & Ent. L.J. 293, 302 (1992). 
25 JAMES SUROWEICKI, THE WISDOM OF CROWDS (2004). 
26. See Tom W. Bell, The Specter of Copyism v. Blockheaded Authors:  How User-Generated 
Content Affects Copyright Policy, 10 VAND. J. ENT & TECH. L. 841, 852–54 (2008) (explaining 
that technology advances have decreased cost of producing and distributing expressive works, 
resulting in more blockhead authors).  But see Graeme Austin, Property on the Line: Life on the 
Frontier between Copyright and the Public Domain, 44 VICTORIA UNIVERSITY OF WELLINGTON L. 
REV. 1, 12 (2013) (contrasting the “kid in the United States college dorm room, with ready access 
to bandwidth, hardware and software” with resource-strapped working adults, and pointing out 
that not all would-be creators can afford to be “blockheads”: “Surplus time and money for amateur 
creativity probably sit somewhere near the top of the Maslovian hierarchy. Not all of us ever reach 
those toney heights. To champion amateur user-generated content uncritically, without 
interrogating these class implications, seems like an irresponsible basis for the formulation of 
social policy.”). 
27 Laurent Pfister, “La ‘Révolution’ de la communication radiophonique, une onde de choc sur le 
droit d’auteur?”, in B. Teyssié (ed.), La communication numérique. Un droit, des droits, 183, 195 
(2012) citing F. Lubinski, « Droit d'auteur et radiodiffusion. Proposition de modification de 
l’article 11 bis de la Convention de Berne », R.J.I.R., 1934, p. 41 (translation mine).  
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the right to demand that he contribute his works to the cultural capital of the 
nation,” he declared.28 Even then, however, a jaundiced commentator observed “it 
is pure Pharisee-ism to claim that [the challenges to exclusive rights] had the goal 
of spreading knowledge of works of authorship; they never had any goal or result 
other than to allow industry to profit from the labors of authors.”29   
I would like to suggest that today’s counterpart – or antidote? – to the 
romantic author, the techno postmodernist participant, is also a shill for big 
industry.  The instrumentalization of the author, or of the anti-author, still serves 
big business,30 it’s just that the business consumes copyrighted works, rather than 
produces them.    
In the welter of interested challenges to authors’ property rights in their 
creations, we should not forget that copyright advances the concerns of the 
collectivity: it promotes artistic freedom and free speech by enabling authors to 
earn (or perhaps more often, eke out) a living from their creativity.31 As Victor 
Hugo proclaimed at the International Literary Congress convened in 1878 to urge 
international protection for authors: 
 
Literary property is in the public interest.  All the old monarchic laws have 
rejected, and continue to reject literary property.  To what end?  In order to 
enslave.  The writer who is an owner [of his literary property] is a writer who 
is free.  To take his property away is to deprive him of his independence.32 
 
So let’s take seriously the proposition that proprietary authorship furthers the 
commonweal.  That rather than suppressing speech, it advances it; by providing 
professional creators with the prospect of earning a living, it promotes a diversity 
of expressions that might otherwise remain unvoiced.  Poverty is a kind of 
censorship, too.33   
                                                          
28 Id..  
29 Id., citing Paul Olagnier, Le droit d'auteur, Paris, LGDJ, 1934, vol. 1, p. 73 (translation mine). 
30 Cf. Anupam Chander and Madhavi Sunder, The Romance of the Public Domain, 92 Cal. L. 
Rev. 1331, 1335-56  (2004) (“Just as the trope of the romantic author has served to bolster the 
property rights claims of the powerful, so too does the romance of the public domain.  
Resourcefully, the romantic public domain trope steps in exactly where the romantic author trope 
falters.  Where genius cannot justify the property claims of corporations because the knowledge 
pre-exists any ownership claims, the public domain can.”). 
31 TJ Stiles, Among the Digital Luddites, 38 COLUM. J. L. & THE ARTS (forthcoming 2015).  
32 Société des Gens de Lettres de France, Congrès Littéraire International de Paris 1878 (Paris, 
1879), p. 106 (translation mine). 
33 See The impact of intellectual property regimes on the enjoyment of right to science and 
culture, submission by the Kernochan Center for Law, Media & the Arts at Columbia University 
School of Law to the UN Special Rapporteur on the International Covenant on Economic, Social 
and Cultural Rights on the Impact of Intellectual Property Regimes on the Enjoyment of Rights to 
Science and Culture at 4 (September 2014): “Censorship can be achieved by outright bans of 
authorial work. It can also be achieved by denying authors the ability to reach a market for their 
works through techniques such as putting authors on “gray lists” that prevent them from finding 
publishers for their works. An especially effective way to censor creative authorship is to 
eliminate material rewards, so that few people, other than the economically elite, can undertake to 
be an author.” 
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Regarding authorship in the digital era, I doubt neither that the web vastly 
enlarges the numbers of people who commit acts of authorship, nor that digital 
media promote new kinds of authorship, from wikis to mashups to fanzines to 
kinetic graphics to blogs and beyond.  Professional authorship will nonetheless 
persist, I believe, whether because we still value individual genius (or at least 
expertise), and/or because not all readers/viewers/listeners will want to be 
participatory all the time.  Recombinant and instant authorship may or may not be 
passing fancies; professional authors will still be with us.  Moreover, they will be 
joined by a host of newcomers, for example, as bloggers become novelists or 
write book-length nonfiction, or simply persist in their online endeavors.  At least, 
professional authors will remain as long as the writing and other creative trades 
furnish adequate remuneration.34  As my former colleague, legal philosopher 
Jeremy Waldron, put it, the author may be dead, but she still responds to 
economic incentives.  The question for the future of copyright, and for the 
author’s place in it, is how to make those incentives meaningful for creators. 
 
3.  Making Copyright Work for Authors 
 
That question entails two others.  First, will authors retain their copyrights 
in the digital environment?  Second, even if authors are copyright owners, will 
they be able to avail themselves of business models that succeed in reaping 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
See also, Austin, Property on the Line, supra, at 15 (citations omitted):  The International 
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights “invites us to take seriously the idea that 
liberty interests can be furthered by participation in functional markets for creative work.”   
. . .[T]he right to participate in private markets for creative work helps to carve out for 
authors "a zone of personal autonomy in which authors … control their productive 
output, and lead independent, intellectual lives." These are things any free society needs, 
and they are nurtured by a system that enables authors to derive at least some of their 
income from a paying public (assuming they can find one) rather than depending entirely 
on political or other forms of patronage. In other words, if the public domain were all we 
had, if property in creative outputs were dispatched over the line, we risk creating a new 
kind of thraldom. 
34 Writers themselves query whether professional authors will survive if, notwithstanding viral 
readerships, no one pays them for their work.  See, e.g., Rob Levine, FREE RIDE; HOW DIGITAL 
PARASITES ARE DESTROYING THE CULTURE BUSINESS, AND HOW THE CULTURE BUSINESS CAN 
FIGHT BACK 252--53 (2011) (arguing that the internet diminishes creators’ potential to profit from 
their work because illegal activities and free content undermine the legitimate market); Barbara 
Garson, If Only Pageviews were Dollars, PUBLISHERS WEEKLY (Sept. 12, 2-14),  
http://publishersweekly.com/pw/by-topic/columns-and-blogs/soapbox/article/63987-content-
provider-goes-bacterial-but-who-will-pay-her.html (“In the online era, who will send first-time 
authors those small checks that prove to their parents (and themselves) that they’re professionals? . 
. . [H]ow will we pay writers in a world awash in free words?”); Authors’ Licensing and Collecting 
Society, WHAT ARE WORDS WORTH?: COUNTING THE COST OF A WRITING CAREER IN THE 21ST 
CENTURY: A SURVEY OF 25,000 WRITERS 9 (2007), available at 
http://www.alcs.co.uk/Documents/Downloads/whatarewordsworth.aspx (surveying authors in 
Europe and finding that less than 15% of authors have received compensation for online uses of 
their work); Robert McCrum, From Bestseller to Bust: Is This the End of an Author’s Life? (Mar. 2, 
2014), http://www.theguardian.com/books/2014/mar/02/bestseller-novel-to-bust-author-life (citing 
the rise of free content on the internet as a challenge for authors today and finding that writing is 
increasingly unprofitable for unknown authors).   
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meaningful remuneration despite wide-scale unauthorized and unpaid use of their 
works? 
 
a. Authors and Publishers 
 
Some of the same factors that today cause copyright to be derided may 
also come to the aid of individual authors.  The technology that brings works 
directly to users’ computers and personal portable devices no longer requires 
traditional publishing’s infrastructure of intermediaries.  Techno postmodernism 
notwithstanding, maybe every reader is not truly an author, but every author can 
be a publisher.  At least, every computer-equipped author can make her work 
directly available to her audience via the Internet.  But availing oneself of the 
means of distribution is one thing, making a living from the works one distributes 
is another,35 particularly when the media that empower authors also empower 
users to acquire and disseminate works for free.  Moreover, not every author or 
performer will want to self-publish.  Many will prefer the assistance of 
distribution intermediaries (e.g., book publishers and record producers) to attend 
not only to the production and distribution which authors and performers might 
now do themselves, but also to provide the credibility, publicity, and most 
importantly, the advances, that come from signing a publishing contract.  
But must that signing also condemn the author to the Roz Chast-ian 
bargain evoked earlier?  While, with the exception of the termination right, 
Congress has not sought to redress the imbalance of power between publishers 
and most authors, other countries’ legislatures, particularly in the EU, have.36  The 
French law on authors’ contracts, including recent amendments to the regime of 
publishing contracts, warrants wistful contemplation as an example of how a 
copyright law might endeavor to ensure that authors either retain their copyrights 
or receive fair compensation for their alienation. 
 The French Code of Intellectual Property safeguards authors against 
leonine transfers in a variety of ways.  In addition to mandating that publishing 
contracts, performance rights contracts, and audiovisual production contracts be 
                                                          
35 See, e.g., Brian Stelter, For Web TV, a Handful of Hits but No Formula for Success, N.Y. 
Times, Aug. 31, 2008, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/09/01/business/media/01webisodes.html?pagewanted=all (Striking 
Hollywood writers created independent “webisodes.”  “The strategy seemed simple:  make money 
by going straight to the Internet.  Months later, they are realizing that producing Web content may 
be easy but profiting from it is hard.”);  Trent Hamm, The Truth About Making Money Online, The 
Christian Science Monitor, Oct. 29, 2013, available at http://www.csmonitor.com/Business/The-
Simple-Dollar/2013/1029/The-truth-about-making-money-online (describing how “the only way 
to make money consistently online is to produce a lot of content on a very consistent basis” and 
that proceeds are often realized in the long-term, not immediately after publication); Jim Edwards, 
Yes, You Can Make Six Figures as a YouTube Star . . . And Still End Up Poor, Business Insider, 
Feb. 10, 2014, available at http://www.businessinsider.com/how-much-money-youtube-stars-
actually-make-2014-2 (finding that even YouTube content providers that generate high gross 
revenue see less than 50% of that revenue, resulting in unsustainable costs for building a 
business).  
36 See supra, note 15.  In addition, collective management associations representing authors and 
collectively licensing their rights are far more prevalent outside the US.   
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in writing,37 the law further requires that each right granted be distinctly specified 
in the contract, and that the scope of the grant be defined with respect to its 
purpose, its geographic extent, and its duration.38 As a general rule, authors are to 
receive royalties, rather than a lump-sum payment.39 Amendments to the statutory 
provisions on publishing contracts, introduced at the end of 2014, further detail 
authors’ rights in print and digital editions of literary works.  These modifications 
seek to ensure that publishers will in fact exercise the rights that authors grant 
them, and will fairly account to authors for the fruits of those exploitations.  
Failure to publish the work within a certain time, or to pursue the exploitation of 
the rights in a consistent manner (“exploitation permanente et suivie”), or to 
reissue a book that has gone out of print, will result in reversion of print or 
electronic rights to the author.40 The new provisions require the grant to 
distinguish print from digital editions, and impose additional author protections 
with respect to the latter.  Notably, the contract must guarantee authors just and 
fair remuneration for all the revenues deriving from the commercialization and 
dissemination of digital editions.41  In addition, contracts granting electronic 
rights must include a clause providing for periodic review of the economic 
conditions of the grant;42 an accord between associations of authors and of 
publishers will determine the frequency of the reviews and will provide guidelines 
for dispute resolution.43  The law also promotes the development of digital 
editions because a grantee who fails to disseminate a digital edition within the 
time set out in an accord between associations of authors and of publishers will 
                                                          
37 France, Code of Intellectual Property, art. L131-2.  U.S. Copyright law requires that the grant 
of any exclusive right must be in writing and signed by the grantor, 17 U.S.C. sec. 204(a). 
38 Id. art. L131-3 (“La transmission des droits de l'auteur est subordonnée à la condition que 
chacun des droits cédés fasse l'objet d'une mention distincte dans l'acte de cession et que le 
domaine d'exploitation des droits cédés soit délimité quant à son étendue et à sa destination, quant 
au lieu et quant à la durée ”).  The author may grant rights for future modes of exploitation 
unknown at the time of the contract, but such a grant must be explicit, and must provide for a 
share in the profits of the new form of exploitation .  Id. art. L131-6 (“La clause d'une cession qui 
tend à conférer le droit d'exploiter l'œuvre sous une forme non prévisible ou non prévue à la date 
du contrat doit être expresse et stipuler une participation corrélative aux profits d'exploitation. ”). 
39 Id. art. L131-4 (“La cession par l'auteur de ses droits sur son œuvre peut être totale ou partielle. 
Elle doit comporter au profit de l'auteur la participation proportionnelle aux recettes provenant de 
la vente ou de l'exploitation. ”). 




41 Id. art. 132-17-6 (“Le contrat d'édition garantit à l'auteur une rémunération juste et équitable sur 
l'ensemble des recettes provenant de la commercialisation et de la diffusion d'un livre édité sous 
une forme numérique. ”). 
42 Id. art. L.132-17-7 (“Le contrat d'édition comporte une clause de réexamen des conditions 
économiques de la cession des droits d'exploitation du livre sous une forme numérique. ”). 
43 Id. art. L. 132-17-8(8) (“L'accord mentionné au I fixe les modalités d'application des 
dispositions :  
8° De l'article L. 132-17-7 relatives au réexamen des conditions économiques de la cession des 
droits d'exploitation d'un livre sous forme numérique, notamment la périodicité de ce réexamen, 
son objet et son régime ainsi que les modalités de règlement des différends.”). 
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lose those rights back to the author.44  Moreover, as to contracts concluded before 
the law’s effective date, the law empowers authors two years thereafter to demand 
that the publisher produce a digital edition; the publisher’s failure to do within 
three months following proper notification results in reversion of the digital rights 
to the author.45 
 
b. Authors As Publishers 
 
Whether or not measures like France’s will inspire the U.S. Congress, 
were it to embark on “the next great copyright act,”46 to add author-protections to 
the rules on transfers of copyright, some authors will in any event chose to forego 
intermediary publishers (and others will fail to attract them).  Having kept their 
copyrights, what are their prospects for exploiting them?  To an increasing extent, 
every author can employ electronic copyright management, and/or copyright 
management collectives to set the financial and other terms and conditions for 
access to and copying of her work.  Or, more rudimentarily, she can make the 
work available without technological restraints, and appeal to user generosity,47 
though, as Radiohead and Stephen King discovered, passing the hat may prove a 
precarious strategy.48  
                                                          
44 Id. art. L. 132-17-5 (“Lorsque l'éditeur n'a pas procédé à cette réalisation [du livre sous une 
forme numérique], la cession des droits d'exploitation sous une forme numérique est résiliée de 
plein droit.”). 
45 Ordonnance n° 2014-1348 of 2 November 2014, transitional provisions, art. 9.  Arts. 11 and 12 
provide for application of other author protections to contracts concluded before the law’s 
effective date. 
46 See Maria A. Pallante, The Next Great Copyright Act (26th Horace S. Manges Lecture), 36 
Colum. J. L. & the Arts 315 (2013) 
47 Crowdfunding sites, such as Kickstarter and similar websites (Go Fund Me, Indiegogo) can 
assist authors to generate the funding necessary to create their works in the first place, but are not 
a useful source of remuneration.  On crowdfunding sites, creators are expected to estimate the 
amount they need to complete a specific project, and induce people to pledge to that project in 
exchange for rewards (e.g., prints of a art project or free downloads of a song). See, e.g., 
Kickstarter, Creator Questions, https://www.kickstarter.com/help/faq/creator%20questions (last 
visited Feb. 4, 2015).  On Kickstarter at least, the creator receives money only if the full amount 
asked for is funded.  If pledges fall short, no money changes hands.  For success rates, see 
Kickstarter, Stats, https://www.kickstarter.com/help/stats (last visited Feb. 4, 2015). If pledges 
exceed the cost of creation, then the creator may keep the difference. However, there are many 
costs additional to the cost of creation, for example fees to the hosting website or rewards to 
backers.  Amanda Palmer made more than 10 times what she needed during a Kickstarter 
campaign, but once all costs of the project, hosting, and rewards were paid, she cleared only about 
$100,000 (an 8% profit). Salvador Briggman, How to Make Money on Kickstarter, CrowdCrux, 
available at http://www.crowdcrux.com/make-money-kickstarter/ (last visited Oct. 30, 2014).  Cf. 
Cord Jefferson, Amanda Palmer’s Million-Dollar Music Project and Kickstarter’s Accountability 
Problem, Gawker (Sept. 19, 2012), available at http://gawker.com/5944050/amanda-palmers-
million-dollar-music-project-and-kickstarters-accountability-problem (questioning whether 
Amanda Palmer’s reporting of an 8% profit was honest and pointing out that Kickstarter does not 
guarantee that the project actually gets completed or that the money is used to fund it). 
48 See, e.g., Joshua Gans, Pay-What-You-Want Experiments, From Stephen King to Kickstarter, 
HARVARD BUSINESS REVIEW (May 3, 2011),  https://hbr.org/2011/05/pay-what-you-want-
experiments (describing Stephen King’s abandoned experiment with pay-what-you-want); Eric 
Garland, The “In Rainbows” Experiment: Did It Work?, NPR (Nov. 16, 2009), 
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Nonetheless, some variations on pass-the-hat may succeed.  For example, 
The Humble Bundle service offers bundles of digital content, primarily video 
games and comic books.  It makes each bundle available online for a limited 
amount of time.  The user selects the price he is willing to pay (there is no 
suggested price, but the minimum is $1) and the division of his payment among 
the content creators, and website-designated charities. The pricing scheme has 
generated some revenue,49  but many users continue to pirate works.50 
Pay-what-you-want, moreover, may disadvantage lesser-known creators, 
since the desire to pay may decrease with the celebrity of the beneficiary.51   As 
one commentator put it, pay-what-you-want can work where there is “a fair 
minded customer, strong relationship with customer, a product that can be sold 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
http://www.npr.org/blogs/monitormix/2009/11/the_in_rainbows_experiment_did.html (finding 
that although Radiohead, as a part of its pay-what-you-want scheme, “offered a legal free and low-
cost option to obtain the album from its Web site, piracy was up . . .  at 10 times the rate of new 
releases from other top artists”).   However some commentators believe Radiohead’s experiment 
was in fact a success, in part because of the interest generated by the novel payment option.  See 
Daniel Kreps, Radiohead Publishers Reveal “In Rainbows” Numbers, ROLLING STONE (Oct. 15, 
2008), http://www.rollingstone.com/music/news/radiohead-publishers-reveal-in-rainbows-
numbers-20081015 (reporting that although “more people downloaded the album for free than 
paid for it . . . [$3 million in sales] is a hugely-successful number considering the album was both 
given away for free and that it was actually downloaded more times via Bit Torrent than free and 
legally through Radiohead's own site.”).   
49 In 2013, a Humble Bundle co-founder stated that the service had grossed over $50 Million. 
Interview by John Walker with John Graham, Co-Founder, Humble Bundle (Aug. 23, 2013) 
available at  http://www.rockpapershotgun.com/2013/08/23/interview-humble-bundle-on-humble-
bundles/. A currently-available bundle on Humble Bundle has received an average of over $6 per 
download. Statistics, HUMBLE BUNDLE, https://www.humblebundle.com/ (last visited Feb. 4, 
2015). 
50 The first bundle available online had a 75% sales rate, but nonetheless grossed $1.3 Million in 
revenue. Sam Machkovech, Beyond Radiohead: Video Games One-Up the Pay-What-You-Want 
Model, THE ATLANTIC, Dec. 14, 2010, available at 
http://www.theatlantic.com/entertainment/archive/2010/12/beyond-radiohead-video-games-one-
up-the-pay-what-you-want-model/67921/. 
Comedians have experimented with pay-what-you-want as well. In 2011, Louis C.K. offered 
videos of a live performance online and grossed over $1 million in the first two weeks. Press 
Release, A Statement From Louis C.K. (Dec. 13, 2011), available at 
https://buy.louisck.net/news/a-statement-from-louis-c-k. He stated online that, “If anybody stole it, 
it wasn't many of you. Pretty much everybody bought it.”  He also stated that his profits (taking 
into account only short-term profits) were less than he would have made by allowing a large 
company to film and distribute the performance, but that they would have charged the consumer 
about $20 for an encrypted and restricted-use copy. Press Release, Another Statement From Louis 
C.K. (Dec. 21, 2011), available at https://buy.louisck.net/news/another-statement-from-louis-c-k. 
51 For comedians specifically, it seems that less high-profile performers than Louis CK are using 
pay-what-you-want with mixed success.  Comedian Steve Hofstetter released an album under a 
pay-what-you-want model (with a minimum of 1 cent) even earlier than Louis CK.  Although at 
the time, he was relatively unknown, he was coming off a successful first album.  In the early 
stages of the offering, he averaged $6 per album, which is more than triple the royalty he would 
receive if it were distributed by a label.  Daniel Langendorf, Comedian Hofstetter Experiments 





credibly at a wide range of prices, or a product with low marginal cost.”52  Even 
then, generosity does not always abound, neither in the proportion of users who 
pay, nor in the amount expended by those who do pay. For example, the website 
Tech Dirt, a blog and news source on technology news, provided a pay-what-you-
scheme in its “Insider Shop.”  Customers could choose several options ($0, $5, 
$10, $20, or $20), although the $5 default payment somewhat masked the zero 
option.  The site optimistically advertised the experiment as a success, although 
51% of downloaders paid nothing and the average price paid was $2.41.53   
Another variation on pay-what-you-want is Flattr, an online service to 
which internet consumers pay a fixed monthly fee.  As Flattr’s users peruse 
websites and see creations they like, they click the “Flattr” button (like the 
Facebook “like” button).  Flattr tallies up all of the users’ clicks in a month and 
divides their monthly subscription fees among the owners of the creations they 
clicked.54  The service is a far cry from systematic remuneration for authors; 
indeed Flattr seems to characterize the payments more as donations than as 
license fees.55     
“Freemium,” a hybrid free-access/paid-access model, which allows access 
to the bottom tier of content for free, but charges per unit or by subscription for 
more or better content, or for content without advertising, offers another approach 
for authors’ self-financing on the Internet.56 The model has perhaps encountered 
                                                          
52 Isamer Bilog, Are “Pay What You Want” Models the Road to Success?, SPINNAKR BLOG (May 
2013), available at http://spinnakr.com/blog/ideas/2013/05/pay-what-you-want-pricing-model/ 
(describing various examples of successful pay-what-you-want models). 
53 By contrast, Cards Against Humanity (an adult card game similar to Apples to Apples) offered 
an expansion pack under a pay-what-you-want model.  It used social pressure to discourage people 
from the zero price, by shaming customers who attempted to pay nothing at all.  Although almost 
20% of customers still paid nothing, the average price paid was $3.89 (greater than the $3 per unit 
cost of manufacturing and shipping). CARDS AGAINST HUMANITY, Holiday Stats, 
http://cardsagainsthumanity.com/holidaystats (last visited Jan. 30, 2015). 
54 FLATTR, How Flattr Works, https://flattr.com/howflattrworks (last visited Nov. 2, 2014). 
55 See, e.g., Mike Butcher, Flattr Now Monetizes the Like Economy by Connecting Social 
Accounts With Payments, TECH CRUNCH (Mar. 18, 2013), available at 
http://techcrunch.com/2013/03/18/flattr-now-monetizes-the-like-economy-by-connecting-social-
accounts-with-payments/ (noting that “Flattr users can now give and receive micro-donations 
directly on other web services they already use . . . [including] Twitter, Instagram, Soundcloud, 
Github, Flickr, Vimeo, 500px and App.net” but “it’s unlikely to make anyone rich just yet because 
it will require many more people to open Flattr accounts”);  L.M. Go on, Flattr Yourself, THE 
ECONOMIST (Jan. 21, 2011), available at 
http://www.economist.com/blogs/babbage/2011/01/another_approach_micropayments (noting that 
“[f]or Flattr to have an impact on the way online content is consumed and produced, however, it 
would need to become massive”) 
56 Currently, the principal successful exploiters of “freemium” models appear to be web services, 
rather than individual creators.  Jason Cohen, Reframing the Problems With “Freemium” By 
Charging the Marketing Department, VENTUREBEAT (Apr. 19, 2013), available at 
http://venturebeat.com/2013/04/19/reframing-the-problems-with-freemium-by-charging-the-
marketing-department/ (arguing that freemium is essentially a marketing strategy, and, given its 
expense, a difficult one to surmount without substantial resources and know-how); Sarah E. 






its greatest success with digital phone applications.57  The content provider hopes 
to attract a large number of free users and convert a percentage of them to 
premium users.58  The freemium model typically begins as a loss-leader, until 
enough users become premium users to turn a profit.59  Its success thus depends 
on attracting and retaining customers and efficiently developing and marketing 
the premium content. 
Following its unhappy essay with pass-the-hat, Nine Inch Nails 
experimented with of the freemium model for its album release of Ghosts I-IV.  In 
conjunction with the release, the band proposed a number of different packages to 
consumers, including offering the first nine tracks of the album for free on their 
website and through BitTorrent. Premium packages ranged from $5 for a full 
album download to a $300 “ultra deluxe” package including CDs, vinyl LPs, and 
signed prints.60 Within the first week, lead singer Trent Reznor made over $1.6 
million on the release.61 
Like pay-what-you-want, however, this approach may primarily benefit 
creators, and especially performers, who already enjoy a substantial fan base.  But 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
782317318996.html) (concluding that freemium is a "costly trap" which can destroy businesses 
that lack the sophistication to implement it properly and that it is rarely executed well by start-ups 
in part because “[t]he freemium approach doesn't make sense for any business that can't eventually 
reach millions of users”)   One example is Spotify Premium.  With a free Spotify account, a user 
can stream unlimited music.  However, every 10 minutes or so, there is a minute of advertising.  A 
subscription to Spotify Premium for $9.99 per month removes advertising interruptions.  It also 
allows users to download songs to listen to offline on their computers or phones. (See Spotify, 
Premium, https://www.spotify.com/us/?_ga=1.146397108.1257926096.1414689432#premium  
(last visited Oct. 30, 2014).) 
Additional examples are Pandora, Angry Birds, and Xobni (a smart address-book service that 
compiles contact and social information from LinkedIn, Facebook, and Twitter), which remove 
advertising from the interface once the user pays for a premium account.  (See Michael 
Learmonth, Why the “Freemium” Model is Bad for Advertisers, AdvertisingAge (Apr. 23, 2013), 
available at http://adage.com/article/digital/freemium-model-bad-advertisers/241042/.) 
57 For recent statistics on how the monetization of mobile apps through the freemium model is 
working, see John Koetsier, Mobile App Monetization: Freemium is King, But In-App Ads Are 
Growing Fast, Venture Beat (Mar. 27, 2014), available at 
http://venturebeat.com/2014/03/27/mobile-app-monetization-freemium-is-king-but-in-app-ads-
are-growing-fast/. 
58 It has been suggested that the most profitable model is continually to attract a large number of 
users, and focus on converting a modest percentage (research suggests successful companies range 
from 2 to 5%); indeed, even free users are valuable if they refer new users to the content. Vineet 
Kumar, Making “Freemium” Work, HARVARD BUSINESS REVIEW, May 2014, at 27. 
59 Glenn Peoples, Business Matters: Spotify UK Shows that the Freemium Model is Not 
“Unsustainable,” BILLBOARD BIZ, Oct. 9, 2012, available at 
http://www.billboard.com/biz/articles/news/1083467/business-matters-spotify-uk-shows-that-the-
freemium-model-is-not (analyzing Spotify UK’s profits over multi-year period and finding loss in 
early years does not indicate overall unprofitability of the freemium business model). 
60 Daniel Kreps, Nine Inch Nails Surprise Fans by Web-Releasing New “Ghosts” Album, 
ROLLING STONE, Mar. 3, 2008, available at http://www.rollingstone.com/music/news/nine-inch-
nails-surprise-fans-by-web-releasing-new-ghosts-album-20080303. 
61 See Daniel Kreps, Nine Inch Nails’ “Ghosts I-IV” Makes Trent Reznor a Millionaire, ROLLING 
STONE, Mar. 13, 2008, available at http://www.rollingstone.com/music/news/nine-inch-nails-
ghosts-i-iv-makes-trent-reznor-an-instant-millionaire-20080313.  The 2500 “ultra deluxe” 
packages available sold out within 30 hours of the release. Id.  
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the scheme can apply more broadly, at least to recording artists.  For example, 
Bandcamp, a music streaming and download website, allows artists to develop 
their own freemium pricing schemes.  Artists upload their music and choose 
whether to price it free, pay-what-you-want, or for a fixed price.62 
Freemium models, by placing some content behind paywalls, rely to a 
greater or lesser extent on technological protection measures to secure the 
paywall.63  There has been much debate over whether technological protection 
measures (also referred to as DRM—digital rights management) are worth the 
candle, given their unpopularity and the relative ease with which consumers can 
elude them.64    Some have contended that DRM decreases music sales, especially 
for less popular albums because it prevents sharing of the album when uninhibited 
redistribution would provide more exposure (and, supposedly, in the long run, 
sales) for the performing artists.65  In fact, some technological measures are more 
obnoxious than others.  Many people deplore copy controls on downloads.66  For 
example, in 2009, Apple and Steve Jobs, whose iPod had been the most 
noteworthy and successful utilizer of download control technology, began 
offering DRM-free music in the iTunes Store.67  DRM in the e-books market has 
                                                          
62 Bandcamp claims to have made $82 Million for musicians so far.  ARTISTS, Bandcamp, 
http://bandcamp.com/artists (last visited Sept. 30, 2014). 
63 See generally Ashkan Soltani, Protecting Your Privacy Could Make You the Bad Guy, WIRED 
(Jul. 23, 2013), available at http://www.wired.com/2013/07/the-catch-22-of-internet-commerce-
and-privacy-could-mean-youre-the-bad-guy/ (describing various technological measures used to 
enforce paywalls including tracking cookies and browser fingerprinting),  Some companies offer 
software to website and app developers that allows content providers to protect and monetize 
freemium content.  See, e.g., INSIDE Secure Protects Premium Content for Snap, Sky 
Deutschland’s Online Media Application, MARKETWATCH (June 4, 2014), available at 
http://www.marketwatch.com/story/inside-secure-protects-premium-content-for-snap-sky-
deutschlands-online-media-application-2014-06-04 (reporting on software used to protect online 
and mobile premium video content); OOYALA, Solutions, http://www.ooyala.com/solutions (last 
visited Nov. 2, 2014) (offering software “protect premium content from unauthorized access”). 
64. Even though the eluding, or aiding the eluding by distributing descramblers, is illegal, see 
17 U.S.C. sec. 1201(a)(b).  For recent entrants in the ongoing debate over the desirability and 
effectiveness of DRM, see, e.g., Andrew V. Moshirnia, Giant Pink Scorpions: Fighting Piracy 
with Novel Digital Rights Management Technology, 23 DEPAUL J. ART, TECH. & INTELL. PROP. L. 
1, 6--7 (2012) (describing various methods of DRM and noting that it has been largely ineffectual 
and that “[a] technologically-impervious DRM is unlikely to emerge”); (Jerry) Jie Hua, Toward A 
More Balanced Model: The Revision of Anti-Circumvention Rules, 60 J. COPYRIGHT SOC'Y U.S.A. 
327, 328--30 (2013) (describing DRM as a preventative measure against piracy and noting 
criticism of the DMCA’s overprotection of DRM technologies). 
65 Andrew Flanagan, DRM Was a Bad Move: Sales Found to Increase 10% After Dropping the 
Chains (Study), BILLBOARD, Dec. 2, 2013, available at 
http://www.billboard.com/biz/articles/news/digital-and-mobile/5812288/drm-was-a-bad-move-
sales-found-to-increase-10-after (reporting study finding that absence of DRM increased sales by 
30% for albums that sold less than 25,000 copies and by 24% for albums that sold less than 
100,000 copies; the study found no discernable increase in sales for the most albums, reasoning 
that those albums are already known and do not need sharing to increase awareness). 
66 There is even a “Day Against DRM.” See Katherine Noyes, Four Ways to Celebrate “Day 
Against DRM” Today, PC WORLD, May 4, 2012, available at 
http://www.pcworld.com/article/255066/four_ways_to_celebrate_day_against_drm_today.html. 




also provoked opposition on the grounds that the protection measures prevent 
sharing and resale of e-books and reduce compatibility between devices.68  By 
contrast, most people seem not to notice, much less denounce, the technology that 
controls streaming media.69  For example, the Netflix subscription that lets you 
watch unlimited quantities of movies but doesn’t let you create retention copies70; 
or the YouTube video clips that you can watch in more or less real time, but not 
download to keep.71  And, to return to freemium, restricting access to the upper 
tier of content, or requiring payment after a certain number of free views or 
downloads (an increasing practice in the beleaguered journalism business72) 
seems to be gaining general public acceptance, despite its reliance on 
technological protection measures to separate the free and premium tiers.73  
                                                                                                                                                                                           
content, including eBooks, movies, and apps remain protected by DRM.  Concerning Apple’s 
motivations for abandoning DRM, see Jessica Litman, Antibiotic Resistance, 
http://www.umich.edu/~jdlitman/papers/AntibioticResistance.pdf (discussing the initial role of 
DRM in contributing to Apple’s dominance of market for MP3 players and the disadvantages of 
DRM once Apple had eclipsed its rivals). 
68 At least one e-book publisher has gone DRM-free, but the major publishers retain DRM 
protection. See Suw Charman-Anderson, Macmillan’s Tor Abandons DRM, Other Publishers 
Must Follow, FORBES MAGAZINE, Apr. 25, 2012, available at 
http://www.forbes.com/sites/suwcharmananderson/2012/04/25/macmillans-tor-abandons-drm-
other-publishers-must-follow/. 
69 Note that while end users remain largely ambivalent, some sophisticated internet companies are 
opposed to DRM in the streaming context. See Jeremy Kirk, Mozilla Hates It, But Streaming 
Video DRM is Coming to Firefox, PC WORLD, May 15, 2014, available at 
http://www.pcworld.com/article/2155440/firefox-will-get-drm-copy-protection-despite-mozillas-
concerns.html (noting that Mozilla opposes DRM technologies and quoting CTO saying, “we 
would much prefer a world and a Web without DRM”). 
70 See Anthony Park & Mark Watson, HTML5 Video at Netflix, NETFLIX TECHBLOG (Apr. 15, 
2013), available at http://techblog.netflix.com/2013/04/html5-video-at-netflix.html (noting that 
DRM is a requirement for any premium subscription video service). 
71 While YouTube does not allow downloading (see GOOGLE SUPPORT, Download YouTube 
Videos, https://support.google.com/youtube/answer/56100?hl=en (last visited Nov. 1, 2014), it is 
possible to download free software that (illegally) circumvents this and lets users to convert 
YouTube videos into mp4 files.  (See, e.g., Jim Martin, How to Download YouTube Videos - Save 
to Your PC, Laptop, iPhone, iPad or Android Device, PC ADVISOR (Mar. 17, 2014), available at 
http://www.pcadvisor.co.uk/how-to/photo-video/3492830/how-download-youtube-videos/.) 
72 See Rachel Bartlett, News Corp Outlines “Freemium” Subscription Model for Australian, 
JOURNALISM (June 7, 2011), available at http://www.journalism.co.uk/news/news-corp-outlines-
freemium-subscription-model-for-australian/s2/a544630/ (reporting that News Corp was so 
“encouraged by the ‘success’ of paywalls at fellow News Corp titles the Times and Sunday 
Times” that on a third paper, it “will offer access to some content free . . . while others will require 
payment to view”); FREEMIUM.ORG, New York Times, http://www.freemium.org/new-york-times/ 
(last visited Nov. 2, 2014) (reporting statistics on implementation of the New York Times’s 
freemium model and concluding that it “proved that freemium model can work in news industry”); 
Jasper Jackson, BILD CEO on Freemium Paywalls, Protecting Ads and Being the Burger, THE 
MEDIA BRIEFING (Mar. 24, 2014), available at  http://www.themediabriefing.com/article/donata-
hopfen-bild-axel-springer-paywalls-charging (describing Germany’s highest circulation 
newspaper’s new freemium model “which leaves some content outside the paywall on its mobile 
sites, but charges for content with more ‘added value’ and for access via apps”). 
73 See Vineet Kumar, Making “Freemium” Work, HARVARD BUSINESS REVIEW, May 2014, at 27 
(“Over the past decade ‘freemium’—a combination of ‘free’ and ‘premium’—has become the 
dominant business model among internet start-ups and smartphone app developers”).. 
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As a practical matter, the future of copyright for professional authors is 
likely to depend on the development of consumer-friendly payment and protection 
mechanisms.  Free distribution can, of course, enhance the author’s fame, but if 
the author cannot capitalize on her fame by exploiting her copyrights, then she 
will not have made much progress.  (A starving artist’s garret is still a garret, even 
if the address is well-known.)  I am not sanguine about the non-copyright 
alternatives, most of which involve giving the copyrighted work away as a loss 
leader to get consumers to spend money on something else whose supply the 
author can control.  This is sometimes called the “Grateful Dead model”: I sell my 
song for a song, but make you pay real money for the t-Shirts that allow you to 
express your affection for my band.74 Some performing artists today may make 
money on everything from clothing lines and perfume to licensing their songs to 
TV shows and movies to uploading content to YouTube.75  But that kind of 
licensing operation probably requires a distribution intermediary, and the 
increasingly popular “360 deal” in contemporary recording contracts, granting to 
the label the rights including merchandizing, film, and TV or guaranteeing the 
label a cut of profits from those activities,76 significantly limits performers’ 
revenues on rights peripheral to the recorded performance.  
Furthermore, the success of these models assumes, counter-factually, that 
the demand for bundled goods or services is infinitely expandable, and even more 
counter-factually, that it is applicable to all kinds of works of authorship.  For 
example, the public may be willing to purchase some successful performers’ 
“allegiance goods,” but who ever heard of the non-performing artist songwriter 
whose works the singer performs, much less would be interested in paying to 
blazon her name across his chest?  Or, “bundling” services with intellectual 
content may work well for software, for which “helplines” can be an essential 
adjunct, but I see less prospect for a service après vente for a photograph. 
More fundamentally, copyright is not just about money; it is also about 
artistic integrity.  As Pulitzer Prize-winning playwright Doug Wright recently put 
it: 
 
. . . copyright guarantees us only one thing, one ephemeral, 
fleeting, but indispensable thing: our singularity as artists. 
Copyright acknowledges the innate worth of an individual author’s 
voice; that a well-turned phrase by Philip Roth or an acerbic line of 
dialogue by Edward Albee, or the haunting melody of ‘Sunrise, Sunset’ by 
                                                          
74. For speculation about how to make money notwithstanding widespread unpaid digital 
uses, see, e.g., Cory Doctorow, INFORMATION DOESN’T WANT TO BE FREE: LAWS FOR THE 
DIGITAL AGE 53-63 (“How Do I Get People to Pay Me?”) (2014). 
75 Steve Knopper, Nine Ways Musicians Actually Make Money Today, ROLLING STONE (Aug. 28, 
2012), available at http://www.rollingstone.com/music/lists/9-ways-musicians-actually-make-
money-today-20120828.  See also Peter Dicola, Money from Music: Survey Evidence on 
Musicians' Revenue and Lessons About Copyright Incentives, 55 ARIZ. L. REV. 301 (2013) 
(reporting results of survey regarding sources of revenue streams across 5,000 musicians). 
76 Daniel J. Gervais, Kent M. Marcus, Lauren E. Kilgore, The Rise of 360 Deals in the Music 
Industry, 3 LANDSLIDE 40, 41 (2011).  An additional problem is that even though the labels hold 




Jerry Bock is as special, as distinctive, as a thumb print or a strand of 
DNA.  
. . . Because of copyright, I get to be the CEO of my own 
imagination.  When I create a work, copyright acknowledges that it 
belongs to me as fully as a newborn belongs to its mother. And just like a 
parent, I am granted responsibility for its future.77 
 
Thus, copyright is also about maintaining control – both economic and artistic – 
over the fate of the work.  Artistic control concerns authors’ interests in receiving 
authorship credit and in maintaining the integrity of their works (“moral rights”), 
as well as their determination of when and how to release their works to the 
public.  Artists who self-distribute on the Internet may exercise the latter form of 
control, for example, by first making their works available to a dedicated fan base 
on a site such as Bandcamp, before authorizing its broader dissemination via 
streaming platforms such as YouTube.  Whether or not such strategies yield 
creators more money, the power to decide whether, when and how to bring one’s 
work to the public is both one that copyright law has long secured,78 and one of 
considerable importance to creators, including in the online environment.79  
As for “moral rights,” some developments suggest that the Web may not 
create an ineluctably hostile environment for these interests.  For example, 
attribution and integrity clauses have long characterized licenses in the open 
source software community.80  Creative Commons offers a means to self-
distribute over the Internet and preserve authors’ moral rights of attribution and 
integrity.  The default CC license requires attribution of authorship, and the author 
may also choose to include an “ND” (no derivatives) icon,81 which might serve to 
                                                          
77 Doug Wright, Playwrights and Copyright, 38 COLUM J. L. & ARTS (forthcoming 2015). 
78 See, e.g., Harper & Row v. Nation Ents., 471 U.S. 539, 554-55 (1985). 
79 See, e.g., interview with composer-cellist Zoë Keating, “Google Plays Hardball with Indie 
Musicians”, http://www.studio360.org/story/google-plays-hardball-with-indie-musicians-zoe-
keating/ (Feb. 5, 2015) (“I’m not going to [agree to YouTube’s new contract for streaming music] 
at the expense of that control over releasing my music.”); Holly Robinson, Should You Self 
Publish? From Traditional to Indie and Back Again: One Hybrid Author Tells All, HUFFINGTON 
POST (Aug. 7, 2013), available at http://www.huffingtonpost.com/holly-robinson/should-you-self-
publish-f_b_3721206.html (“As an indie author, you have complete control. You decide when 
your book is ready for public consumption, and you decide what sort of indie publisher to take on 
as your partner.”)  
80 See, e.g., Nicolas Suzor, Access, Progress, and Fairness: Rethinking Exclusivity in Copyright, 
15 Vand. J. Ent. & Tech. L. 297, 339-40 (2013) (describing common license terms in free 
software license agreements); Rebecca Schoff Curtin, Hackers and Humanists: Transactions and 
the Evolution of Copyright, 54 IDEA 103, 115--16 (2014) (noting that free software “values a 
software author's moral rights over the kinds of exclusive rights conveyed by U.S. copyright law” 
and describing incorporation of rights of integrity and attribution into free software licenses); Greg 
R. Vetter, The Collaborative Integrity of Open-Source Software, 2004 Utah L. Rev. 563, 685, tbl. 
2 (comparing the inclusion of rights of integrity and attribution in a few open source licenses and 
discussing the enforcement of the right of integrity under an open source license); Various 
Licenses and Comments About Them, GNU OPERATING SYSTEM, 
https://www.gnu.org/philosophy/license-list.html (last visited Feb. 9, 2015) (listing and assessing 
common licenses for open source software)    
81 ABOUT THE LICENSES, Creative Commons, http://creativecommons.org/licenses/ (last visited 
Sept. 30, 2014); Metrics / License Statistics, CREATIVE COMMONS WIKI, 
20 
 
instruct users not to alter or modify the work.82  These licenses may even be 
enforceable.83 
But CC licenses accompany works distributed online for free.  For authors 
who seek to earn a living from their work online, the absence of a CC payment 
mechanism may pose an insuperable shortcoming.  A CC-licensed work may help 
introduce an author to an audience, but at some point a professional author needs 
to be paid.  Authors who self-distribute on the Web thus may face the prospect of 
respect for their names and their works, but without remuneration.84  In effect if 
not intention, Creative Commons proclaims that “money is nothing” and 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
https://wiki.creativecommons.org/Metrics/License_statistics#License_property_charts (last visited 
Feb. 9, 2015) (showing that more than 96% of creative commons licenses contain attribution 
provision and nearly 25% retain the integrity right). 
82  It is not clear whether the excluded “derivatives” are “derivative works” in the copyright 
sense, in which case the instruction might not bar all modifications or alterations, but only those 
which sufficiently transform the work to constitute new works of authorship.  To the extent that 
modifications may compromise a work’s integrity without necessarily yielding a new work, the 
ND icon would not fully correspond to the moral right of integrity.  See Mira T. Sundara Rajan, 
Creative Commons: America's Moral Rights?, 21 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 
905, 928 (2011).  On the other hand, CC’s plain-English explanation of what ND means—“[t]his 
license allows for redistribution, commercial and non-commercial, as long as it is passed along 
unchanged and in whole, with credit to you.”  Id. at 927 (emphasis added).—suggests a non-
technical understanding of the term.  See also Suzor, supra, at 340 (“Each of these different 
licenses reflects a particular conception of harm, and it is only by building on copyright's 
exclusive rights that the licenses are able to strike a balance between access and integrity with 
which the author is comfortable.”). 
83 Jacobsen v. Katzer, 535 F.3d 1373, 1380, 1383 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (finding that because "the 
terms of the Artistic License [requiring attribution of incremental software authorship] allegedly 
violated are both covenants and conditions, they may serve to limit the scope of the license and are 
governed by copyright law.”).  See also Victoria Nemiah, License and Registration, Please: Using 
Copyright "Conditions" to Protect Free/open Source Software, 3 NYU J. INTELL. PROP. & ENT. L. 
358, 387 (2014) (describing best practices for open source licensing enforcement).  
84 Professional publishing contracts, by contrast, in addition to providing for remuneration, may 
include clauses providing for authorship credit, see, e.g., clause 1 of sample magazine publishing 
contract at http://web.law.columbia.edu/keep-your-copyrights/contracts/samples/17, and 
occasionally, for author control over the work’s integrity, see. e.g., clause 4 of sample book 
publishing contract at http://web.law.columbia.edu/keep-your-copyrights/contracts/samples/11.  
See also  Professional Artists Client Toolkit, Contracts, ARTPACT.COM, 
https://www.artpact.com/Contracts (last visited Feb. 9, 2015) (website for illustrators offers model 
contracts, all of which contain an attribution clause in conjunction with the copyright notice).  
Many contracts, however, protect neither attribution nor integrity rights.   See e.g., “creator 
unfriendly” and “incredibly overreaching” contracts on the keepyourcopyrights.org website.  Self-
publishing through platforms like Amazon’s Kindle Direct Publishing (KDR) may provide 
remuneration, but the KDR license contains neither explicit attribution nor integrity clauses.  In 
fact, it allows Amazon to change the scope of rights at any time in its sole discretion.  See Kindle 
Direct Publishing Terms of Service, KINDLE DIRECT PUBLISHING, 
https://kdp.amazon.com/help?topicId=APILE934L348N (last visited Feb. 9, 2015).  As for 
whether self-publication in fact pays, compare Alison Flood, Stop the Press: Half of Self-
Published Authors Earn Less Than $500, THE GUARDIAN (May 24, 2012), available at 
http://www.theguardian.com/books/2012/may/24/self-published-author-earnings; with Steve 
Henn, Self-Published Authors Make A Living---And Sometimes A Fortune, NPR (July 25, 2014), 
available at http://www.npr.org/blogs/money/2014/07/25/334484331/unknown-authors-make-a-
living-self-publishing (reporting anecdotal evidence through Amazon e-books, “many relatively 
unknown authors are making a decent living self-publishing their work.”). 
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“[r]eputation is everything;”85 if CC-implemented moral rights come at the price 
to authors of unpaid distribution of their works, then, the overall endeavor of 
authorship becomes devalued.86  Authors’ moral rights claims underscore their 
dignitary interests, but, particularly in our society, money and dignity are closely 
intertwined.   
In any event, for many authors, whether on principled objection to 
obligatory gratuity, or out of necessity, the trade-off between money and artistic 
integrity often will favor the former.87 It may be cynical to suggest that one can 
bear having one’s artistic vision mangled, so long as the mangling occurs all the 
way to the bank.  To the extent the observation is true, it brings us back to 
payment.  Easing88 or diversifying89 legal means of accessing work may increase 
payments to authors and artists.  Another way is advertising, and many big 
copyright battles, notably Viacom’s suit against Google-YouTube90, have really 
been about who gets what cut of the advertising revenue.  But the advertising 
revenue can also go to authors, assuming that they retain the relevant copyright 
interests.91 
Some major streaming services share ad revenue with creators. For 
example, YouTube pays record producers and songwriters a percentage of the 
revenue received from advertising accompanying videos.92  But YouTube’s 
policies in connection with its new Music Key streaming service appear to require 
artists and composers to sacrifice control over which platforms they post to first in 
exchange for receiving a share of advertising revenue through YouTube’s Content 
ID service.  In effect, YouTube will continue to add to its repertory not only 
content the creator had licensed to YouTube, but also works or performances that 
                                                          
85 See Sundara Rajan, supra, at 931. 
86 Id. 
87 See, e.g, Wright, supra (maintaining copyright ownership over his plays allows him to control 
the integrity of his work, but not to earn a living from it; for the latter he writes screenplays, which 
pay well, but require him to give up any copyright interest). 
88 It has long been suggested that a way to compete with free music is in combination to lower the 
cost to consumers or decrease the effort required to download legal music. See, e.g.,  Henry H. 
Perritt, Jr., New Business Models for Music, 18 VILL. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 63, 208 (2011). 
89 For example, Spotify, which provides unlimited on-demand music streaming services reported 
that its availability reduced piracy in Australia by 20%. Max Mason & Paul Smith, Artists Suffer 
as Online Piracy Worsens, FINANCIAL REVIEW, Sept. 16, 2014, available at 
http://www.afr.com/p/technology/artists_suffer_as_online_piracy_5qsfQmSay6z8rb15utnLvI.  
90 See, e.g., Viacom Intern., Inc. v. YouTube, Inc., 676 F.3d 19 (2d Cir. 2012). 
91 This approach has been suggested for blogs posting content by unpaid providers, which in 
theory could either pay a flat fee per article or create an ad-revenue sharing scheme. Nate Silver, 
The Economics of Blogging and The Huffington Post, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 12, 2011 12:28 P.M.), 
available at http://fivethirtyeight.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/02/12/the-economics-of-blogging-and-
the-huffington-post/ (also noting that the complications of a revenue-sharing model would 
outweigh the benefit of compensating unpaid contributors on the Huffington Post because 96% of 
traffic is directed to content by paid contributors). 
92 Laura Sydell, YouTube Shares Ad Revenue With Musicians, But Does It Add Up?, NPR MUSIC 





third parties have posted, and unless the creator agrees to the new terms instituted 
with the Music Key service, she will not be paid for any of the content.93  
Spotify includes ad revenue in calculating the total amount of royalties it 
will pay out.94  Blip, a free online distributer of web series, pays content providers 
50% of the advertising revenue they generate.95 It is not clear, however, that these 
services in fact generate meaningful income streams for authors,96 or, for that 
matter that copyright owners, who may be receiving income from advertisements 
on online platforms, are in fact sharing it with authors.97     
By contrast, author-oriented business models for aggregating sales of 
content, or that undertake micro-licensing of content for incorporation in other 
works, are beginning to emerge.  Two examples, both from the independent music 
business, may point the way.  CD Baby is an artist-run hub for sales of CDs and 
downloads by independent recording artists.  The artists set the prices; CD Baby 
promotes and sells the recordings both direct to consumers and to online music 
retailers, returning most of the revenue to the artists.98  CD Baby has also 
partnered with Rumblefish, a micro-licensing service for recording artists.  
                                                          
93 See Google Plays Hardball with Indie Musicians, STUDIO 360 (Feb. 5, 2015), available at 
http://www.studio360.org/story/google-plays-hardball-with-indie-musicians-zoe-keating/.  
94 SPOTIFY EXPLAINED, Spotify,  http://www.spotifyartists.com/spotify-explained/ (last visited 
Sept. 30, 2014). 
95 USER TERMS OF USE, Blip (last visited Sept. 30, 2014), available at http://blip.tv/terms. 
Blip (also known as Blip.tv), is a website that helps up-and-coming television and webisode 
producers develop and distribute work. Blip editors select web series to include on the site, and 
viewing content is free.  Blip and its content providers are paid for by ad revenue. (See BLIP, 
About, http://blip.tv/about (last visited Oct. 30, 2014). For a discussion of how the advertising 
works, see Janko Roettgers, Blip to Publishers: We’re Going to Monetize Your videos, Whether 
You Like it or Not, GIGAOM (Mar. 25, 2013), available at https://gigaom.com/2013/03/25/blip-
preroll-ads/.) 
96 Spotify pays royalties ranging from $0.006 to $0.0084 to artists based on percentage of streams 
the artist receives of all users’ plays. Victor Luckerson, Here’s How Much Money Top Musicians 
Are Making on Spotify, TIME, Dec. 3, 2013, available at 
http://business.time.com/2013/12/03/heres-how-much-money-top-musicians-are-making-on-
spotify/; see also  SPOTIFY EXPLAINED, Spotify,  http://www.spotifyartists.com/spotify-explained/ 
(last visited Sept. 30, 2014).  Even with millions of streams, however, the sums add up to very 
little, see Phillip Pantuso, The Best Way to Make Money on Spotify, Brooklyn Magazine (Mar. 21, 
2014), available at http://www.bkmag.com/2014/03/21/the-best-way-to-make-money-on-spotify/ 
(“Despite the growing user base, a microscopic proportion of bands with songs on Spotify (or 
Pandora and Rdio, for that matter) see any financial benefits whatsoever.”)   See also, US 
Copyright Office, Copyright and the Music Marketplace, 73-80 (“Impact of Music Streaming 
Models”) (Feb. 2015) (detailing diminution in songwriter and performer revenues as consumption 
shifts from purchases of copies to accessing streams of recorded musical compositions). 
97 See, e.g., US Copyright Office, Copyright and the Music Marketplace, supra, at 77 (lack of 
transparency about how -  or whether – rights owner intermediaries distribute streaming revenues 
to creators  “can create uncertainty regarding which benefits of the deal are subject to being shared 
with Artists at all,” quoting submission of SAG-AFTRA and AFM).  Jessica Litman has suggested 
that pro-author transparency could prove an attractive business strategy: online services which 
disclosed how much of the price of a stream or download will in fact be paid to creators of a work 
might garner more users than less transparent services, see Jessica Litman, Fetishizing Copies, in 
Ruth Okediji, ed., COPYRIGHT IN AN AGE OF EXCEPTIONS AND LIMITATIONS (forthcoming 2015) 




Musicians place their music in the Rumblefish catalog and video-editors and app 
developers can license the recorded songs for incorporation in audiovisual works.  
Rumblefish then distributes license fees to the copyright owners.99  YouTube and 
other social video sites link directly to Rumblefish so that uploaders can license 
their soundtracks as they upload video.  So far, the Rumblefish catalog contains 
over 5 million tracks, which have been licensed for over 65 million videos’ 
soundtracks, resulting, according to Rumblefish, in millions of dollars in royalties 




The author’s place in the future of copyright (assuming copyright has a 
future) will not be assured until the full range of her interests, monetary and 
moral, receive both recognition and enforcement. Online micropayment and other 
systems for remunerating individual authors (including by means of collective 
licensing), albeit often embryonic, hold promise.  But will these new means of 
remunerating authors (or for that matter older business models which, while often 
divesting authors of their rights, also often afforded them an income stream) 
remain viable in a digital environment in which paying for creativity increasingly 
seems an act of largesse?  Most fundamentally, we need to appreciate authorship, 
and to recognize that a work in digital form is a thing of value,101 lest the old 
                                                          
99 RUMBLEFISH, Micro-Licensing, http://rumblefish.com/micro-licensing/ (last visited Nov. 2, 
2014). 
100 Press Release, Top YouTube Music Partner Rumblefish Breaks 1 Billion Monthly Views, 
Boasts 5 Million Copyrights Under Management (Apr. 2, 2014), available at 
http://www.marketwired.com/press-release/top-youtube-music-partner-rumblefish-breaks-1-
billion-monthly-views-boasts-5-million-1895259.htm. 
For further discussion of evolving author-oriented micro-licensing business models, see, e.g, Peter 
Munters, Digital Pioneers Explore the Social Economy of Music (April 26, 2014), 
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adage that “information” (meaning, works of authorship) “wants to be free” 
presage works of authorship that don’t “want” to be created. 
